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ABSTRACT: The mental logic 
theory claims that the disjunc-
tion introduction rule, which is 
a valid rule in classical logic, is 
not a rule naturally used by the 
human mind. However, a study 
carried out by Orenes and John-
son-Laird suggests that this 
theory is wrong because there 
are cases in which the disjunc-
tion introduction rule appears 
to be applied by individuals. 
Orenes and Johnson-Laird ex-
plain their results based on the 
mental models theory. Never-
theless, in this paper, I try to 
show that, if it is assumed that 
people recover, by means of a 
semantic analysis of possibili-
ties, the real logical forms of 
propositions before using formal 
rules, the mental logic theory 
can also explain the results 
achieved by Orenes and John-
son-Laird. Likewise, I include 
some comments on the possibil-
ity that both theories are com-
plementary and related. 
RESUMEN: La teoría de la lógica 
mental sostiene que la regla de in-
troducción de la disyunción, que es 
una regla válida en la lógica clásica, 
no es utilizada de manera natural 
por la mente humana. Sin embargo, 
un estudio realizado por Orenes y 
Johnson-Laird sugiere que esta teo-
ría no es correcta porque existen ca-
sos en los que parece que los indivi-
duos aplican la mencionada regla. 
Orenes y Johnson-Laird explican 
sus resultados en base a la teoría de 
los modelos mentales. No obstante, 
en este trabajo, trato de mostrar 
que, si se asume que las personas 
recuperan, por medio de un análisis 
semántico de posibilidades, las for-
mas lógicas reales de las proposicio-
nes antes de utilizar reglas forma-
les, la teoría de la lógica mental 
también puede explicar los resulta-
dos logrados por Orenes y Johnson-
Laird. Del mismo modo, incluyo al-
gunos comentarios sobre la posibi-
lidad de que ambas teorías sean 
complementarias y se hallen rela-
cionadas. 
RÉSUMÉ: La théorie de la logique 
mentale soutient que la règle 
d'introduction de la disjonction, 
qui est une règle valable dans la 
logique classique, n'est pas utili-
sée naturellement par l'esprit hu-
main. Cependant, une étude réali-
sée par Orenes et Johnson-Laird 
suggère que cette théorie n'est pas 
correct, car il ya des cas où il 
semble que les individus appli-
quent la règle ci-dessus. Orenes et 
Johnson-Laird expliquer leurs ré-
sultats basés sur la théorie des 
modèles mentaux. Toutefois, dans 
cet article, j'essaie de montrer que, 
en supposant que des gens se ré-
tablissent, à travers une analyse 
sémantique des possibilités, les 
formes réelles logiques de proposi-
tions avant d'utiliser des règles 
formelles, la théorie de la logique 
mentale peut aussi expliquer les 
résultats obtenus par Johnson-
Laird et Orenes. De même, j'inclus 
quelques commentaires sur la 
possibilité que les deux théories 
sont complémentaires et sont su-
jet connexe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
An interesting debate has characterized cognitive science over recent de-
cades. That debate is that related to the relations between logic and human 
mind. It can be said that there are different theoretical positions in this re-
spect. However, in this paper, I will only consider two of them: the mental 
models theory (e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2009; Johnson-Laird, 1983, 
2001, 2006, 2010, 2012; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002; Johnson-Laird, 
Byrne, & Girotto, 2009; Oakhill & Garnham, 1996; Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 
2012) and the mental logic theory (e.g., Braine & O´Brien, 1998a; O´Brien, 
2009). The reason why I will only focus on these two theories is that, as it 
has been shown by López Astorga (2013), many cognitive phenomena can 
be explained both by the mental models theory and by an approach based 
on the formal rules of logic. In this way, it seems appropriate to look for facts 
or experimental results that are consistent with one of these two frameworks 
and incompatible with the other one. 
 
As it is well known, the mental models theory states that human reason-
ing works by means of the analysis of the possibilities corresponding to 
propositions. Thus, individuals tend to only assume the possibilities, or 
models, to which the premises refer and that are coherent with the conclu-
sions. A good example can be its account of the Modus Ponens logical rule 
(𝑝𝑝 → 𝑞𝑞,𝑝𝑝 ⊢ 𝑞𝑞). According to this theory, a conditional sentence such as 𝑝𝑝 → 𝑞𝑞 
has three models: 
 
(1) 𝑝𝑝 & 𝑞𝑞 
(2) ¬𝑝𝑝 & 𝑞𝑞 
(3) ¬𝑝𝑝 & ¬𝑞𝑞 
 
Apart from the fact that only (1) is an explicit model (following the mental 
models theory, (2) and (3) are implicit models that can only be recovered by 
means of certain cognitive effort), if we know that 𝑝𝑝 is true, the only possible 
model is (1), since 𝑝𝑝 is false - ¬𝑝𝑝 is true – in the other two models. This 
means that there is no possible scenario in which 𝑝𝑝 is true and 𝑞𝑞 is false. 
                                                             
1 This paper is a result of the Project N. I003011, “Algoritmos adaptativos e inferencias lógicas 
con enunciados condicionales”, Supported by the Directorate for Research of Talca University 
(Dirección de Investigación de la Universidad de Talca), Chile. The author and lead researcher 
of this Project would like to thank the mentioned institutions for their help in funding this 
paper. 
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On the other hand, the mental logic theory proposes that human reason-
ing is led by formal rules. Nevertheless, given that this theory is not always 
correctly understood and it is often misinterpreted, it is important to high-
light that, according to it, human beings do not necessarily reason by means 
of the rules of the classic propositional calculus. This theory only tries to 
describe the rules that people use in a natural way, and, although many of 
those rules are rules of the classic logic, not all the rules of this logic are 
admitted by the mental logic theory. For example, an especially relevant da-
tum for this paper is that, according to this approach, people do not usually 
use the disjunction introduction rule (𝑝𝑝 ⊢ 𝑝𝑝 ∨ 𝑞𝑞) (Braine, Reiser, & Rumain, 
1998). 
 
The basic problem is that both theories have a great descriptive and pre-
dictive potential and that, as said, it appears to be necessary to find decisive 
data that allow us to choose one of them. Orenes and Johnson-Laird´s 
(2012) paper seems to give such data. The results of an experiment carried 
out by them show that, although it is true that, in many cases, people do 
not apply the disjunction introduction rule, there are also cases in which 
they do apply that rule. This circumstance is a challenge for the mental logic 
theory, since the mental models theory can explain it and, at least in prin-
ciple, it appears that the mental logic theory cannot do it. Certainly, it is not 
hard for the mental logic theory to explain why individuals do not tend to 
use the mentioned rule. What is difficult for it is to explain why they do use 
that rule in some cases. 
 
Nonetheless, in this paper, I will try to prove that Orenes and Johnson-
Laird´s (2012) findings cannot be considered to be decisive facts in support 
of the mental models theory and against the mental logic theory. In my view, 
if it is assumed that people, before making inferences, process information 
in order to detect the real logical forms of propositions, that is, that there is 
a phase prior to reasoning in which individuals interpret information, it can 
be said that the mental logic theory can also explain the results obtained by 
Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012). 
 
Maybe both theories are not incompatible, and it is very possible that 
each of them focuses on different intellectual activities. In any case, all of 
these issues will be addressed in the next pages. I will begin describing the 
problems of the disjunction introduction rule and the account of them given 
by the mental models theory. Then I will comment the experiment carried 
out by Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012), the results achieved by them, and 
the interpretation of such results that they offer. Finally, I will explain how, 
if the real logical forms of the propositions used in that experiment are iden-
tified, it can be argued that the mental logic theory is also consistent with 
those results. 
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2. A PARADOX RELATED TO DISJUNCTION: THE DISJUNCTION INTRODUCTION 
RULE 
 
Really, the main problem of this paper does not refer to a paradox. That 
is the term used by Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012), who, indeed, are 
aware that it is not a true paradox, with the intention of indicating that there 
is a difficulty related to human reasoning that needs to be explained. That 
difficulty is as follows. 
 
Faced with a proposition, people tend to reject a conclusion derived from 
it in which that proposition is linked to another by means of a disjunction 
(that is, people tend to reject a disjunctive conclusion in which the initial 
proposition is only the first disjunction). In other words, the problem is that, 
as mentioned above, individuals do not often accept a valid logical rule, the 
disjunction introduction rule. Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) offer a the-
matic example of this controversial inference, which is considered by them 
as a ‘paradoxical version’ of it. That example is this one: 
 
“Viv is here. 
Therefore, Pat is here or Viv is here, or both” (Orenes & Johnson-Laird, 
2012: 362). 
 
Based on the mental models theory, Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) 
explain this fact. The models corresponding to the conclusion, if the disjunc-
tion is interpreted as inclusive, are the following: 
 
(A) Pat is here – Viv is here 
(B) Pat is here – Viv is not here 
(C) Pat is not here – Viv is here 
 
These three models refer to the situations in which the conclusion is true, 
but the key is the model (B). (B) is the key because it refers to a situation in 
which the premise, ‘Viv is here’, is false. Therefore, following the mental 
models theory, it is not surprising that individuals tend to reject this infer-
ence. The cause is that the conclusion allows a semantic possibility that is 
incompatible with the premise. 
 
Obviously, this fact could be interpreted as evidence that the mental mod-
els theory holds, since it appears to show that people only reason consider-
ing semantic models, and not formal or syntactic rules. However, this prob-
lem does not really affect theories such as the mental logic theory. As indi-
cated, this last theory does not state that human mind works resorting to 
all the formal rules of classical standard logic. Individuals do not often use 
some of such rules, including precisely the disjunction introduction rule. 
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The real problem for the mental logic theory seems to be that Orenes and 
Johnson-Laird (2012) carry out an experiment with versions (called ‘modu-
lated versions’ by them) of this inference that are accepted as valid by most 
of their participants. As it will be commented in the next section, the mental 
models theory can easily explain such results. The question is whether or 
not the mental logic theory can do so as well. 
 
3. THE DISJUNCTION INTRODUCTION RULE AND MODULATION 
 
According to the mental models theory, sentences, and hence inferences, 
can be modulated in order to block or to facilitate models. Modulation can 
be related to different factors. Nevertheless, as far as the issue of this paper 
is concerned, it can be said that there is a modulation mechanism that can 
transform disjunctive sentences in such a way that people consider as valid 
inferences such as that of Viv and Pat described in the previous section. 
 
Their idea is to create inferences with that same structure but, at the 
same time, with a special characteristic: in the disjunctive conclusion, the 
first disjunction cannot be false if the second one is true. Their example is 
as follows: 
 
“Lucia wore Jewelry. 
 
Therefore, Lucia wore the bracelet or she wore jewelry” (Orenes & John-
son-Laird, 2012: 363). 
 
As it can be noted, the special feature of this inference is that it does not 
refer, as the previous one, to three models, but only to two: 
 
(A) Lucia wore the bracelet – Lucia wore jewelry  
(C) Lucia did not wear the bracelet – Lucia wore jewelry 
 
Evidently, (B) is not possible now because a scenario in which Lucia 
wears the bracelet and she does not wear jewelry cannot be thought. A 
bracelet is jewelry and, therefore, if somebody wears a bracelet, that same 
person wears jewelry. 
 
Thus, in the modulated versions, the conclusion is not linked to models 
inconsistent with the premise, and that circumstance causes people to ac-
cept these versions. This is the account of the mental models theory, and 
Orenes and Johnson-Laird check it by means of their experiment. Certainly, 
they observed that their participants tended to reject paradoxical versions 
of this inference and to accept modulated versions of it. 
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It is obvious that their results clearly support the mental models theory 
and, in principle, it can be thought that these prove that the mental logic 
theory is not correct. This last theory, as said, can explain why people reject 
the paradoxical versions, but not why they accept the modulated versions. 
Nonetheless, in my view, it is not true that the mental logic theory cannot 
explain why the participants in Orenes and Johnson-Laird´s (2012) experi-
ment tended to admit the modulated versions. To show it, it is only neces-
sary to assume that the logical forms of propositions are not exactly those 
that literally appear in natural language. In this way, my idea is basically 
that, in the modulated versions, the conclusion is not truly a disjunction. 
 
4. THE LOGICAL FORM OF THE MODULATED VERSIONS 
 
The conclusions of the modulated inferences are only apparent disjunc-
tions and it can be proved precisely by resorting to the analysis of possibili-
ties that, based on the mental models theory, Orenes and Johnson-Laird 
(2012) raise. As indicated, the conclusions of the modulated versions only 
refer to models of the types (A) and (C), that is, to models with these struc-
tures: 
 
(A) 𝑝𝑝 & 𝑞𝑞 
(C) ¬𝑝𝑝 & 𝑞𝑞 
 
This means that the conclusions can only be true in one of these two 
cases: when both 𝑣𝑣(𝑝𝑝) = 1 and 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞) = 1 or when 𝑣𝑣(𝑝𝑝) = 0 and 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞) = 1. Obvi-
ously, ‘𝑣𝑣’ refers to the truth value of the formula between brackets, ‘1’ stands 
for truth and ‘0’ stands for falsehood. 
 
However, based on this information, it cannot be said that the conclusion 
is a disjunction, since as it is well-known, 𝑣𝑣(𝑝𝑝 ∨ 𝑞𝑞) = 1 if one of these situa-
tions happens: 
 
1) 𝑣𝑣(𝑝𝑝) = 1 and 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞) = 1 
2) 𝑣𝑣(𝑝𝑝) = 1 and 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞) = 0 
3) 𝑣𝑣(𝑝𝑝) = 0 and 𝑣𝑣(𝑞𝑞) = 1 
 
Otherwise, 𝑣𝑣(𝑝𝑝 ∨ 𝑞𝑞) = 0. 
 
Therefore, it seems suitable to think of a formula that is only true in cases 
(A) and (C), that is, a formula with a true table in which the result is 1 only 
in the cases 𝑝𝑝 ∧ 𝑞𝑞 and ¬𝑝𝑝 ∧ 𝑞𝑞. It is clear that the formula can be, for example, (𝑝𝑝 ∨ ¬𝑝𝑝) → 𝑞𝑞. In fact, this last formula seems to describe the exact meaning 
of Orenes and Johnson-Laird´s (2012) example, which appears to indicate 
that, both if Lucia wears the bracelet and if she does not wear the bracelet, 
she wears jewelry. 
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Thus, if we assume that the real logical form of the conclusions of the 
modulated inferences is not 𝑝𝑝 ∨ 𝑞𝑞, but (𝑝𝑝 ∨ ¬𝑝𝑝) → 𝑞𝑞, the problem seems to be 
solved. It is true that, as the mental logic theory claims, people usually do 
not apply the disjunction introduction rule. What happens to the modulated 
inferences is that they are accepted because they do not require to use that 
rule, but other different rule, the conditional introduction rule (𝑞𝑞 ⊢ 𝑝𝑝 → 𝑞𝑞). 
 
Nevertheless, a new problem appears here. The conditional introduction 
rule is difficult to accept too. Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) also consider 
the inferences based on that last rule to be paradoxical, and they propose 
modulated versions for them as well. Besides, the conditional introduction 
rule is thought to be problematic even from the mental logic theory. For 
example, Braine and O´Brien (1998b) assign it a limited role in the basic 
model linked to primary skills of the mental logic theory, and Braine and 
O´Brien (1998c) acknowledge that they thought of the possibility of intro-
ducing some restrictions to this rule. Nonetheless, this new problem can be 
easily removed. The real true table of the conclusion of the modulated infer-
ences is indeed equivalent to that of (𝑝𝑝 ∨ ¬𝑝𝑝) → 𝑞𝑞, but it is equivalent to that 
of only 𝑞𝑞 too. 
 
Thus, it is also possible to assume that the real logical form of the mod-
ulated conclusions is just 𝑞𝑞. It would not be hard to admit because the un-
derlying idea to Orenes and Johnson-Laird´s (2012) example also seems to 
be that, whatever happens, Lucia wears jewelry. But the most important fact 
here is that, if 𝑞𝑞 is the true logical form of the conclusions of the modulated 
inferences, it can be stated that the real structure of the modulated infer-
ences is not 𝑞𝑞, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑝 ∨ 𝑞𝑞, but 𝑞𝑞, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑞𝑞, or, if preferred, 𝑞𝑞 ⊢ 𝑞𝑞. 
 
In this way, given that it does not appear to be a problem, from the mental 
logic theory perspective, that a formula can be drawn from itself, it can be 
said that the mental logic theory can also explain the results achieved by 
Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012) regarding the disjunction introduction 
rule. According to this theory, people do not usually apply this rule, which 
explains why the participants rejected the paradoxical versions (their struc-
ture was 𝑞𝑞 ⊢ 𝑝𝑝 ∨ 𝑞𝑞). On the other hand, the modulated versions tended to be 
accepted because their real structure did not refer to the application of the 
disjunction introduction rule (their true structure was 𝑞𝑞 ⊢ 𝑞𝑞). Undoubtedly, 
if it is assumed that the real logical forms of propositions are not necessarily 
linked to their structures in natural language, these arguments can be as-
sumed too. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
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As said by López Astorga (2013), the problem of the current cognitive 
science is that there are several theories that can explain the same phenom-
ena. Clearly, it is necessary a crucial information or obvious evidence that 
allows us to decide which of such theories is the correct one. Unfortunately, 
Orenes and Johnson-Laird´s (2012) research do not appear to provide that 
information or that evidence. 
 
Certainly, the mental logic theory seems to need the additional assump-
tion related to the existence of a previous phase of interpretation in which 
the logical forms are recovered. Equally, it is true that that recovery process 
depends, in a way, on the mental models theory, since it is based on the 
semantic analysis of the possibilities to which propositions can refer. So, it 
is clear that syntactic approaches cannot ignore semantics, and that this 
point reveals an important strength of the mental models theory, which does 
not seem to need to consider syntax in its accounts. 
 
Maybe the correct alternative is not to choose between one of these theo-
retical frameworks. This is because it is possible to think that both theories 
are complementary and that each of them addresses a different aspect of 
cognitive activity. A thesis could be that the mental models theory describes 
the semantic processes in which the information is interpreted and the real 
logical forms are detected, and that the mental logic theory describes the 
subsequent processes in which certain logical rules (not necessarily all the 
rules of the classical logic) are applied to the recovered logical forms. 
 
I am aware that the proponents of the mental models theory could argue 
against this idea claiming that their semantic analyses are enough to explain 
and predict the results obtained by individuals in most of reasoning tasks, 
and that, for this reason, it is not necessary to recover logical forms. Never-
theless, the precedent arguments show that syntax and semantics are not 
incompatible and that they can be strongly linked. In this way, although we 
can choose a semantic or a syntax approach, we should not forget that, ap-
parently, cognitive phenomena could be explained from both perspectives. 
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